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The response of disabled people to the possibility of human
germline genome editing (HGGE) is an important topic, and
one recently presented in an article byKleiderman and Kellner
Stedman (2020). The need to engage directly withmembers of
the disability and rare disease community on such develop-
ments in genomic medicine was further underscored by my
recent editorial (Boardman 2020), within which I highlighted
the role of identity politics in informing reactions to HGGE
amongst such groups who live directly with genetic
conditions.
Writing in reaction to this editorial, Iñigo De Miguel
Beriain (2020) has defended the use of HGGE against some
of the critiques levelled by disability rights supporters that I
outlined, by appealing to the principle of human dignity. He
does this through the use of two key points:
1. That life without a disability should be regarded as pref-
erable to one with a disability.
2. That if we were to accept that it is in the best interests of
wider society to retain disability as a trait in its members,
that ‘forcing people to suffer’ (De Miguel Beriain 2020)
with disabilities to meet this end is unethical, because this
would mean that the ‘welfare of human beings [would] be
sacrificed for the good of the collective’, which, he argues,
is not in keeping with the principle of human dignity.
I would like to respond to De Miguel Beriain’s arguments
by firstly highlighting the erroneous assumptions inherent in
his first point, before showing how the second no longer
stands once the first is refuted.
The argument that life without disability must surely be
preferable to one with disability is not new, and one certainly
that is largely upheld within the beliefs and reproductive prac-
tices of wider society. However, I dispute the claim, made
directly by De Miguel Beriain, that the inferiority of life with
disability to one without it is ‘an acceptable conclusion for
everyone’ (De Miguel Beriain 2020).
There are numerous examples of people with genetic con-
ditions who not only readily accept a child with the same
condition as themselves (Henley 2016; Black 2016;
Lancaster 2011) but also sometimes actively seek it (Teather
2002; Shanghavi 2006). A study by Baruch and colleagues,
for example, found that 3% of the 137 IVF centres they sur-
veyed in the USA had used PGD to actively select for the
disabling trait of the parents (Baruch et al. 2008). For some
would-be parents, there are practical considerations (e.g. lin-
guistic, environmental) that inform a decision to select for
disability, or, at least, refrain from preventing it (Shanghavi
2006). Yet for others, the decision stems from a fundamental
conviction that life with a disabling condition is intrinsically
of no less value than a life without it (Wallis 2019). As such,
the physical, financial and psychological risks associated with
technologically mediated reproduction are not justified.
In his response, De Miguel Beriain (2020) does acknowl-
edge, however, that there are some disabled people who are
reluctant to accept treatments for their condition, and as such
may not welcome HGGE technologies. This group of people
he refers to as ‘type A patients’, in contrast to ‘type B pa-
tients’, a category he reserves for those disabled people who
would prefer removal of their condition. Sticking with this
taxonomy, I accept De Miguel Beriain’s statement that it is
difficult—if not impossible–to prenatally predict which re-
sponse (type A or type B) a would-be-disabled embryo will
adopt to their condition. Experience of genetic disability is
alwaysmediated by social, cultural and environmental factors,
healthcare availability and access, and psychological differ-
ences between individuals—factors that cannot be pre-
determined by a genetic test.
Despite this complexity, however, research is increasingly
demonstrating that there are a range of factors that make a
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‘type A’ response to disablement more likely. Amongst which,
early/congenital onset is a significant factor (Bogart 2014,
2019; Hahn and Belt 2004; Shakespeare 2006; Boardman
et al. 2017; Jamoom et al. 2008). People who are born with
their disability are more likely to have incorporated their con-
dition into their identity and sense of self, and to have set their
lives up around its existence than those who firstly experience
able-bodiedness before becoming disabled. People with later
onset disabilities typically undergo significant (and sometimes
recurrent) identity negotiations and life re-structuring as they
adapt to their disability, whichmay involve varying degrees of
loss (Shakespeare 2006). It is these people who are much
more likely to externalise their disability and separate it from
their sense of self (Watson 2002). Such individuals are there-
fore more likely to view their condition as an unwelcome
intrusion in their lives and to desire its eradication. These
individuals are therefore far more likely to fall into the ‘type
B’ category that De Miguel Beriain (2020) had in mind.
De Miguel Beriain (2020) has argued that it is these
people—with experience of both being able-bodied and
disabled—who can give us the greatest insight into the best
interests of the would-be-disabled embryo in HGGE contexts.
However, I suggest that we instead need to focus our attention
on the experiences and perspectives of those whose conditions
are early onset, many of whom (though clearly not all) will be
‘type A patients’. As De Miguel Beriain himself points out,
the single gene disorders that will most likely be targeted by
HGGE are typically early onset in presentation; therefore, it is
these people’s lives who most realistically mirror those to be
expected for the would-be-disabled embryos.
By highlighting this emerging body of research that dem-
onstrates that there are factors that make a type A or type B
response to genetic disability more likely, I am not suggesting
that responses to disability can be predicted. Rather, we need
to acknowledge the complexity of lived experience with ge-
netic disability and the importance of not essentialising that
experience as universally negative and always to be avoided.
Indeed, as social model of disability theorists has long pointed
out, there are a range of factors that have a significant impact
on the experience of disablement that are entirely unrelated to
the impairment itself (Barnes and Mercer 2004; Boardman
et al. 2020).
We should be careful not to assume that disabled people
who do not wish to use reprogenetic technologies in order to
avoid disability, or who otherwise value their lives positively
(perhaps by refusing therapies), are somehow misguided, or
unrepresentative of the views of the wider population of dis-
abled people. Indeed, research continues to highlight what has
come to be termed the ‘disability paradox’, that is, that dis-
abled people consistently rate their quality of life higher than
others do around them (Albrecht and Devlieger 1999). At a
timewhen disabled people are afforded greater support, access
to healthcare and legal protections than ever before in history,
the calculation of whether life with disability is inherently
worse than one without cannot be treated as a one-off decision
as it is so closely bound to the social and environmental con-
text in which that life will be lived out.
De Miguel Beriain’s second argument, that we should not
inflict suffering (through disability) onto people for the greater
good of society, is entirely defeated when we unshackle dis-
ability from its association with suffering. This is not to deny
that genetic conditions can cause suffering—they can, and
they invariably do. Moreover, as we have established, there
is no sufficiently reliable way to distinguish between those
who will suffer with their condition and those who will thrive.
However, whilst De Miguel Beriain argues that, given this
uncertainty, we should err on the side of editing genomes,
we also need to take seriously the harms that are inflicted
when we perpetuate and reinforce a presumed causal relation-
ship between disability and suffering. This pairing not only
impedes a thorough consideration of the range of human ex-
periences that HGGE will impact, but also harms currently
existing disabled people, in a variety of ways.
When De Miguel Beriain states that a person, or society, is
unlikely to ‘miss out on anything’ by no longer having SMA
or haemophilia, I would point to the testimonies of people
who live with these conditions, and whose personalities and
values (and those of the people around them) have been
shaped, in various ways, by experiencing them (Boardman
et al. 2017; Boardman and Hale 2018; Boardman et al.
2019)—even in cases where the condition was described as
involving significant suffering (see ‘Annette’ (pp. 190–191) in
Boardman 2017). Indeed, terms like ‘Deaf gain’ have
emerged to describe the ‘…unique cognitive, creative, and
cultural gains’ that are brought about through Deaf ways of
being in the world (Bauman and Murray 2014) and draw
attention to the possibility of disability being an enriching
experience, both at the individual and societal level.
It is my view that we firstly need to better understand what
we mean by the term ‘suffering’ before we can presume to
apply it to lives not yet lived. The accounts of genetically
disabled people can help us delineate where the boundaries
of suffering might lie, in order to better regulate the appropri-
ate uses of technologies such as HGGE. Indeed, it is thorough-
ly in keeping with, and even integral to, the principle of human
dignity to respect and uphold the value that people assign to
their own lives—even if they contradict our own.
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